My current research as Assistant Professor for Methods and Methodology at the University of Innsbruck spans two strands, united by a focus on computational text analysis.
Trade and the circular economy. I study how export bans, tariffs, and waste-trade restrictions reshape global material flows — and whether such disruptions stimulate domestic innovation rather than simply relocating environmental burdens. Combining trade flow data, policy analysis, and sectoral case studies, this work asks: under what conditions do trade constraints merely shift environmental harm elsewhere, and when do they catalyze genuine circular transformation?
Absence in text and historical AI. A second strand investigates gaps in the textual record — archives, treaties, corporate disclosures — that both researchers and AI systems rely on to reconstruct institutional and historical knowledge. The central question is how absence differs from bias: bias distorts how something is represented once it is present in the record, while absence determines whether it is represented at all. This distinction matters for AI systems trained on historical and institutional text, where standard methods for detecting bias do not necessarily detect what was never recorded in the first place — and where, in some cases, absence itself is not an accident but a governance choice.
Curent Research
Past Research
Trade Agreements and Non-Trade Issues
A central line of research examines how preferential trade agreements incorporate and structure so-called “non-trade issues” such as environmental protection, investment rules, and regulatory cooperation. This work investigates how domestic politics, institutional design, and economic interests shape the depth and enforceability of these provisions.
Non-trade issues in preferential trade agreements and global value chains.
Review of International Political Economy (2024). With Ida Bastiaens and Evgeny Postnikov.
DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2024.2427308
The domestic battle over the design of non-trade issues in preferential trade agreements.
Review of International Political Economy (2016).
DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2016.1231130
Good for some, bad for others: US investors and non-trade issues in preferential trade agreements.
The Review of International Organizations (2018).
DOI: 10.1007/s11558-018-9299-2
Together, these studies demonstrate that trade agreements are not merely tariff-cutting instruments. They are regulatory architectures that distribute power, shape environmental ambition, and structure global production networks.
Trade Policy, Firms, and Global Value Chains
Another strand of my research focuses on how multinational corporations and financial markets respond to trade liberalization and institutional design.
Trade policy in a “GVC World”: Multinational corporations and trade liberalization.
Business and Politics (2020). With Christina Anderer and Andreas Dür.
DOI: 10.1017/bap.2020.4
Winners and Losers From Trade Agreements: Stock Market Reactions to TPP and TTIP.
Politics and Governance (2023). With Andreas Dür.
DOI: 10.17645/pag.v11i4.7146
These studies analyze how firms positioned in global value chains shape and react to trade agreements. They highlight how financial markets anticipate regulatory change and how globalized production transforms political coalitions around trade.
Environmental Commitments in Trade Agreements
A third line of inquiry investigates how environmental protection is institutionalized within trade agreements and how credible such commitments are.
Taking it seriously: commitments to the environment in South-South preferential trade agreements.
Environmental Politics (2022). With Gabriele Spilker.
DOI: 10.1080/09644016.2021.1975399
Mapping the Trade and Environment Nexus: Insights from a New Data Set.
Global Environmental Politics (2018).
DOI: 10.1162/glep_a_00447
This work contributes systematic evidence on the variation, depth, and enforceability of environmental provisions in trade agreements, revealing when environmental governance becomes meaningful and when it remains symbolic.
Institutional Design and Negotiation Dynamics
A further contribution analyzes bargaining dynamics and institutional structures within preferential trade negotiations.
Seal the Deal: Bargaining Positions, Institutional Design, and the Duration of Preferential Trade Negotiations.
International Interactions (2018). With Simon Wüthrich.
DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2018.1500367
This research examines how institutional design choices influence negotiation duration and outcomes, showing how governance structures shape political feasibility.
International Tax Governance
More recently, my work has expanded into the architecture of international tax coordination and legal design.
The Power of Boilerplate: Bilateralism, Plurilateralism, and the International Tax System.
International Interactions (2024). With Vincent Arel-Bundock.
DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2024.2359090
This study investigates how standardized legal language (“boilerplate”) shapes the evolution of international tax governance and institutional convergence.
Trade Agreements and Non-Trade Issues
A central line of research examines how preferential trade agreements incorporate and structure so-called “non-trade issues” such as environmental protection, investment rules, and regulatory cooperation. This work investigates how domestic politics, institutional design, and economic interests shape the depth and enforceability of these provisions.
Non-trade issues in preferential trade agreements and global value chains.
Review of International Political Economy (2024). With Ida Bastiaens and Evgeny Postnikov.
DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2024.2427308
The domestic battle over the design of non-trade issues in preferential trade agreements.
Review of International Political Economy (2016).
DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2016.1231130
Good for some, bad for others: US investors and non-trade issues in preferential trade agreements.
The Review of International Organizations (2018).
DOI: 10.1007/s11558-018-9299-2
Together, these studies demonstrate that trade agreements are not merely tariff-cutting instruments. They are regulatory architectures that distribute power, shape environmental ambition, and structure global production networks.
Trade Policy, Firms, and Global Value Chains
Another strand of my research focuses on how multinational corporations and financial markets respond to trade liberalization and institutional design.
Trade policy in a “GVC World”: Multinational corporations and trade liberalization.
Business and Politics (2020). With Christina Anderer and Andreas Dür.
DOI: 10.1017/bap.2020.4
Winners and Losers From Trade Agreements: Stock Market Reactions to TPP and TTIP.
Politics and Governance (2023). With Andreas Dür.
DOI: 10.17645/pag.v11i4.7146
These studies analyze how firms positioned in global value chains shape and react to trade agreements. They highlight how financial markets anticipate regulatory change and how globalized production transforms political coalitions around trade.
Environmental Commitments in Trade Agreements
A third line of inquiry investigates how environmental protection is institutionalized within trade agreements and how credible such commitments are.
Taking it seriously: commitments to the environment in South-South preferential trade agreements.
Environmental Politics (2022). With Gabriele Spilker.
DOI: 10.1080/09644016.2021.1975399
Mapping the Trade and Environment Nexus: Insights from a New Data Set.
Global Environmental Politics (2018).
DOI: 10.1162/glep_a_00447
This work contributes systematic evidence on the variation, depth, and enforceability of environmental provisions in trade agreements, revealing when environmental governance becomes meaningful and when it remains symbolic.
Institutional Design and Negotiation Dynamics
A further contribution analyzes bargaining dynamics and institutional structures within preferential trade negotiations.
Seal the Deal: Bargaining Positions, Institutional Design, and the Duration of Preferential Trade Negotiations.
International Interactions (2018). With Simon Wüthrich.
DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2018.1500367
This research examines how institutional design choices influence negotiation duration and outcomes, showing how governance structures shape political feasibility.
International Tax Governance
More recently, my work has expanded into the architecture of international tax coordination and legal design.
The Power of Boilerplate: Bilateralism, Plurilateralism, and the International Tax System.
International Interactions (2024). With Vincent Arel-Bundock.
DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2024.2359090
This study investigates how standardized legal language (“boilerplate”) shapes the evolution of international tax governance and institutional convergence.
My current research as Assistant Professor for Methods and Methodology at the University of Innsbruck spans two strands, united by a focus on computational text analysis.
Trade and the circular economy. I study how export bans, tariffs, and waste-trade restrictions reshape global material flows — and whether such disruptions stimulate domestic innovation rather than simply relocating environmental burdens. Combining trade flow data, policy analysis, and sectoral case studies, this work asks: under what conditions do trade constraints merely shift environmental harm elsewhere, and when do they catalyze genuine circular transformation?
Absence in text and historical AI. A second strand investigates gaps in the textual record — archives, treaties, corporate disclosures — that both researchers and AI systems rely on to reconstruct institutional and historical knowledge. The central question is how absence differs from bias: bias distorts how something is represented once it is present in the record, while absence determines whether it is represented at all. This distinction matters for AI systems trained on historical and institutional text, where standard methods for detecting bias do not necessarily detect what was never recorded in the first place — and where, in some cases, absence itself is not an accident but a governance choice.
Curent Research
Past Research
Trade Agreements and Non-Trade Issues
A central line of research examines how preferential trade agreements incorporate and structure so-called “non-trade issues” such as environmental protection, investment rules, and regulatory cooperation. This work investigates how domestic politics, institutional design, and economic interests shape the depth and enforceability of these provisions.
Non-trade issues in preferential trade agreements and global value chains.
Review of International Political Economy (2024). With Ida Bastiaens and Evgeny Postnikov.
DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2024.2427308
The domestic battle over the design of non-trade issues in preferential trade agreements.
Review of International Political Economy (2016).
DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2016.1231130
Good for some, bad for others: US investors and non-trade issues in preferential trade agreements.
The Review of International Organizations (2018).
DOI: 10.1007/s11558-018-9299-2
Together, these studies demonstrate that trade agreements are not merely tariff-cutting instruments. They are regulatory architectures that distribute power, shape environmental ambition, and structure global production networks.
Trade Policy, Firms, and Global Value Chains
Another strand of my research focuses on how multinational corporations and financial markets respond to trade liberalization and institutional design.
Trade policy in a “GVC World”: Multinational corporations and trade liberalization.
Business and Politics (2020). With Christina Anderer and Andreas Dür.
DOI: 10.1017/bap.2020.4
Winners and Losers From Trade Agreements: Stock Market Reactions to TPP and TTIP.
Politics and Governance (2023). With Andreas Dür.
DOI: 10.17645/pag.v11i4.7146
These studies analyze how firms positioned in global value chains shape and react to trade agreements. They highlight how financial markets anticipate regulatory change and how globalized production transforms political coalitions around trade.
Environmental Commitments in Trade Agreements
A third line of inquiry investigates how environmental protection is institutionalized within trade agreements and how credible such commitments are.
Taking it seriously: commitments to the environment in South-South preferential trade agreements.
Environmental Politics (2022). With Gabriele Spilker.
DOI: 10.1080/09644016.2021.1975399
Mapping the Trade and Environment Nexus: Insights from a New Data Set.
Global Environmental Politics (2018).
DOI: 10.1162/glep_a_00447
This work contributes systematic evidence on the variation, depth, and enforceability of environmental provisions in trade agreements, revealing when environmental governance becomes meaningful and when it remains symbolic.
Institutional Design and Negotiation Dynamics
A further contribution analyzes bargaining dynamics and institutional structures within preferential trade negotiations.
Seal the Deal: Bargaining Positions, Institutional Design, and the Duration of Preferential Trade Negotiations.
International Interactions (2018). With Simon Wüthrich.
DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2018.1500367
This research examines how institutional design choices influence negotiation duration and outcomes, showing how governance structures shape political feasibility.
International Tax Governance
More recently, my work has expanded into the architecture of international tax coordination and legal design.
The Power of Boilerplate: Bilateralism, Plurilateralism, and the International Tax System.
International Interactions (2024). With Vincent Arel-Bundock.
DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2024.2359090
This study investigates how standardized legal language (“boilerplate”) shapes the evolution of international tax governance and institutional convergence.
Trade Agreements and Non-Trade Issues
A central line of research examines how preferential trade agreements incorporate and structure so-called “non-trade issues” such as environmental protection, investment rules, and regulatory cooperation. This work investigates how domestic politics, institutional design, and economic interests shape the depth and enforceability of these provisions.
Non-trade issues in preferential trade agreements and global value chains.
Review of International Political Economy (2024). With Ida Bastiaens and Evgeny Postnikov.
DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2024.2427308
The domestic battle over the design of non-trade issues in preferential trade agreements.
Review of International Political Economy (2016).
DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2016.1231130
Good for some, bad for others: US investors and non-trade issues in preferential trade agreements.
The Review of International Organizations (2018).
DOI: 10.1007/s11558-018-9299-2
Together, these studies demonstrate that trade agreements are not merely tariff-cutting instruments. They are regulatory architectures that distribute power, shape environmental ambition, and structure global production networks.
Trade Policy, Firms, and Global Value Chains
Another strand of my research focuses on how multinational corporations and financial markets respond to trade liberalization and institutional design.
Trade policy in a “GVC World”: Multinational corporations and trade liberalization.
Business and Politics (2020). With Christina Anderer and Andreas Dür.
DOI: 10.1017/bap.2020.4
Winners and Losers From Trade Agreements: Stock Market Reactions to TPP and TTIP.
Politics and Governance (2023). With Andreas Dür.
DOI: 10.17645/pag.v11i4.7146
These studies analyze how firms positioned in global value chains shape and react to trade agreements. They highlight how financial markets anticipate regulatory change and how globalized production transforms political coalitions around trade.
Environmental Commitments in Trade Agreements
A third line of inquiry investigates how environmental protection is institutionalized within trade agreements and how credible such commitments are.
Taking it seriously: commitments to the environment in South-South preferential trade agreements.
Environmental Politics (2022). With Gabriele Spilker.
DOI: 10.1080/09644016.2021.1975399
Mapping the Trade and Environment Nexus: Insights from a New Data Set.
Global Environmental Politics (2018).
DOI: 10.1162/glep_a_00447
This work contributes systematic evidence on the variation, depth, and enforceability of environmental provisions in trade agreements, revealing when environmental governance becomes meaningful and when it remains symbolic.
Institutional Design and Negotiation Dynamics
A further contribution analyzes bargaining dynamics and institutional structures within preferential trade negotiations.
Seal the Deal: Bargaining Positions, Institutional Design, and the Duration of Preferential Trade Negotiations.
International Interactions (2018). With Simon Wüthrich.
DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2018.1500367
This research examines how institutional design choices influence negotiation duration and outcomes, showing how governance structures shape political feasibility.
International Tax Governance
More recently, my work has expanded into the architecture of international tax coordination and legal design.
The Power of Boilerplate: Bilateralism, Plurilateralism, and the International Tax System.
International Interactions (2024). With Vincent Arel-Bundock.
DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2024.2359090
This study investigates how standardized legal language (“boilerplate”) shapes the evolution of international tax governance and institutional convergence.